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From the end of World War II to the present, the study of politics in the liberal West, 
both from an empirical and from a normative perspectiv , has focused predominantly on 
the issue of the (re)distribution of socially relevant goods and resources. As a North 
American political scientist famously put it, in the title of an important work, politics was 
essentially about who gets what, when and how.1 In normative political theory, 
(re)distributive justice quickly emerged as the hottest topic of research, as thinkers sought 
to determine how goods and resources should be distributed in a just society. John Rawls’ 
A Theory of Justice appeared in this context arguably as the single most important work 
of Western political philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. 
The reasons for the predominance of the (re)distributive question in post-1945 
Western political thought are not particularly hard to fathom. On the one hand, the West’s 
antagonist in the Cold War espoused a political ideology which called for radical 
redistribution – and to which Western intellectuals naturally felt obliged to reply. On the 
other hand, several states in the West initiated redistributive reforms after the Second 
World War, in the process of erecting a new model of welfare state. 
The (re)distributive question, of course, remains relevant today – even if the welfare 
state is generally thought to be in decline –, and plenty of brilliant minds are drawn to its 
challenges. In the present essay, however, I wish to explore a different view of politics; 
one which sees the fundamental problem of politics as that of order – as opposed to war 
or chaos – and its ultimate, legitimate grounds. Such is, indeed, a logically prior 
conception of the political problem, even if it has been overshadowed for decades by 
(re)distributive concerns. (Re)distribution can only appear as the central political issue as 
long as the basic tenets of order are not considered to be at stake. Today, the rise of 
religious extremism, mass-scale terrorist violence and the predicaments of so-called 
failed states in the economic peripheries – states which fail to secure the basic degree of 
internal peace needed before other tasks, including (re)distributive ones, can be addressed 
– seem to indicate that political order cannot simply be taken for granted the way it used 
to be by mainstream Western intellectuals in the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
In what follows I will consider the political thought of three authors – Max Weber, 
Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt – who were fundamentally concerned with the issue of 
legitimacy, that is, with the problem of «the ultimate grounds of the validity of a 
domination»2. Such concern must be understood in its multiple contexts. In a more 
immediate sense, it is a product of the historical circumstances of war, defeat, revolution 
and permanent political crisis that characterized German-speaking Central Europe 
                                                          
1 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, New York, Whittlesey House, 1936. 
2 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 
1978, p. 953 (emphasis elided). 
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throughout the first half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, in a broader 
perspective, contention around the «ultimate grounds» of political authority appears as a 
clear symptom of late modern intellectual impasses that extend far beyond any specific 
national context; impasses marked both by the modern dissolution of traditional, 
religiously-inspired markers of certainty and by the collapse of the modern rationalist 
illusion which, for a while, upheld the ambition of furnishing an equally stable and lasting 
alternative. Even if a retrospective glance from the standpoint of a consolidated Western 
liberal democracy in the late twentieth (or early twenty-first) century might treat the 
separation of religion and politics as a fait accompli, in the late modern reflections of 
Weber, Kelsen and Schmitt the matter was far from settled. If, for centuries, the 
inscription of the political order in a grander, divinely established order which 
transcended the empirical finiteness of all that is human had supplied political authority 
with a substrate of meaning – and a promise of duration beyond the biological lives of 
rulers and ruled – that was crucial to its legitimacy, secularization posed a very clear and 
serious challenge to the foundations of political order. Political legitimacy was, indeed, 
torn between the immanent movement which sought to ground the political order in its 
own – purely human and rational – terms, on the one hand, and multiple promises of 
transcendence, on the other.                
 
2. Weber: charisma against the full closure of modernity’s «iron cage» 
 
As every reader of The Protestant Ethic surely knows, Max Weber was particularly 
sensitive to the unintended consequences of ideas. Certainly, no Protestant doctrinaire 
intended to provide the spiritual conditions for the emergence of modern capitalism. 
Notwithstanding, the commitment of Protestant asceticism «to remodel the world and to 
work out its ideals in the world»3 ended up infusing «the struggle to rationalize the 
world»4 which characterizes both modern capitalism and modern science. These new 
forces of rational modernity, in turn, quickly emancipated themselves from their religious 
sources and took a life and logic of their own, as they increasingly succeeded in emptying 
social relations from the sacred meanings that used to be attached to them. Such 
evaporation of meaning, as Weber suggests in the breathtaking crescendo that concludes 
The Protestant Ethic, also hits the political philosophy of the Enlightenment and its 
theories of human rights, which he interpreted as the secularization of religious natural 
right doctrines. 5 The golden age of the Rights of Man, according to Weber, extended 
from the second half of the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, as they inspired 
political revolutions in North America and across Europe. However, the substantial 
axiological appeal of the discourse of human rights increasingly wore off, in the process 
of being rationalized into mere legal positivism. The forces of modernity – rationalization, 
bureaucratization, specialization, and secularization – contributed to the erosion of the 
ultimate meaning of all human actions and, thus, alo to a deep crisis of political 
                                                          
3 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London and New York, Routledge, 1992, 
p. 124. 
4 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 64, n. 30 (on p. 181). 




legitimacy. To be sure, such «disenchantment of the world»6 might be interpreted as a 
longed-for liberation from old theological cosmologies, but to Weber it also signaled the 
loss of a significant source of meaning to human life in all its spheres. The prospect of 
the rise of an «iron cage»7 that would incarcerate mankind in a world of routine, function 
and utility, deprived of an ultimate purpose, was amongst Max Weber’s deep-seated fears. 
Still, he was not the type of thinker prone to nurture false hopes or groundless illusions. 
To Weber, a disillusioned realist if there ever was one, the return to an idealized past free 
from the strictures of state bureaucracy and the capitalist economy was nothing but a 
romantic cradlesong that every serious observer had t e uty to discard, if only for the 
very simple reason that pre-modern societies had actually all been filled with plenty of 
harsh strictures of their own. Several, if not most, f the elements that combined to form 
the frightening panorama of the «iron cage» of modern life had to be acknowledged. Yet, 
there still appeared to be some room left for the – owever transient – eruption of sources 
of meaning capable of preventing the full closure of m dernity’s cage. Indeed, the arena 
of politics offered, in Weber’ view, some of such precious promises. For sure, modern 
politics was decisively marked by the unstoppable growth of bureaucratic apparatuses 
both within the state and within the political parties. However, their primacy could still 
be defied by charismatic leaders whose personal qualities allowed them to rise above, and 
command, both the spiritually proletarized party staff  and, eventually, the whole 
machinery of public administration.8 
The concept of charisma, borrowed from Protestant theology, is Max Weber’s key for 
the possibility of an extraordinary rupture with the continuity of modern legal-rational, 
bureaucratic rule. According to Weber’s sociology of d mination, charisma is one of the 
three pure types of legitimate rule, along with tradition and rational legality. As social 
scientific ideal-types, of course, they are trans-historical categories which can have 
explanatory clout in various social, cultural and temporal contexts. Nonetheless, in broad 
world historical terms, there is an implicit linearity to their succession. To sum it up rather 
crudely: it all starts with charisma, force of habit and precedent make tradition out of it, 
which in turn is rationalized, giving rise to modern legality. Charisma is, thus, the original 
focal point of legitimate domination, since it interv nes directly in the realm of symbols, 
representations, values and beliefs within which domination is exercised and with 
reference to which it must be justified. As the author puts it, «charisma, in its most potent 
forms, disrupts rational rule as well as tradition altogether» and «is indeed the specifically 
creative revolutionary force of history»9. In contrast, tradition and legality are but the 
routinization of charisma, providing the system of rule with an essentially derivative form 
of legitimacy.10 
                                                          
6 Max Weber, «The Social Psychology of the World Religions», in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Eds.), 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 290. 
7 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 123. 
8 See Max Weber, «The Profession and Vocation of Politics» (as known as «Politics as a Vocation»), in 
Max Weber, Political Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 351: «[T]he only choice 
lies between a leadership democracy with a ‘machine’ a d democracy without a leader, which means rule 
by the ‘professional politician’ who has no vocation, the type of man who lacks precisely those inner, 
charismatic qualities which make a leader.» 
9 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 1117. 
10 See ibid., p. 252: «Charisma is a phenomenon typical of prophetic movements or of expansive political 
movements in their early stages. But as soon as domination is well established, and above all as soon as 
control over large masses of people exists, it gives way to the forces of everyday routine.» 
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Weber’s transfer of charisma from the paradigmatic instances in the world of ancient 
monotheistic religion to modern politics is, however, filled with thorny implications. To 
begin with, for sure, charisma is largely de-theologized in the process. The modern 
charismatic leader is not a prophet committed to spread the word of the one and only God, 
and thereby to transform the whole set of values and symbolic references of a given 
community. Much more modestly, he appears as a man seeking to further a particular 
cause amongst diverse, either competing or non-mutually exclusive, alternatives, taking 
part in the insolubly pluralistic struggle of religious and secular gods that is so brilliantly 
outlined in «Science as a Vocation»11 as the trademark of the modern fragmented world. 
On the other hand, the modern incarnation of charisma, if it can’t translate into a full-
fledged, successful revolutionary movement12, necessarily entails a compromise with the 
rationalized and bureaucratized institutions of mass democracy. Indeed, in a 
posthumously published essay on the three pure types of l gitimate rule, Weber explicitly 
conceives modern democracy as an anti-authoritarian re nterpretation of charisma which 
involves, in essence, a reversion of the original causal nexus.13 The power of the modern 
charismatic leader stems not anymore primarily from intrinsic exceptional qualities, 
which per se command the devotion of the followers – in the pure form of charismatic 
authority, obedience is an obligation, not a choice –, but instead on the formal, i. e. 
electoral recognition of the former by the latter. What used to be the effect of the 
charismatic appeal – popular recognition – now became the primary cause, the 
fundamental basis of legitimate democratic rule. Charismatic politics was thus embedded 
in the formal procedures of modern democracy. 
Max Weber’s modern charismatic leader appears, hence, as a creature divided between 
the conflicting demands of transcendence and immanence, between the uncompromising 
commitment to whichever grand causes might bestow upon the political order the ultimate 
meaning it so urgently craves for and the necessary reliance on the electorally constructed 
will of the people, which, in the last resort, might deny a leader his charismatic status. 
The ambivalence of Weber’s modern charismatic politics is a major symptom of the 
erosion of standard liberal narratives of political legitimacy in the late modern era. 
  
3. Kelsen: towards an immanent theory of democratic legitimacy 
 
To the ultimately unsolvable dilemma of Max Weber’s modern reenactment of 
charismatic politics one can contrast Hans Kelsen’s ffort to affirm democracy from a 
strictly immanent perspective. Perhaps no other thinker was so strongly committed to 
interpreting legitimacy as formal democratic legality and to freeing the theories of law 
and the state from all theological remnants.  
The problem of political legitimacy is, in the Austrian scholar’s eyes, that of the 
construction of the people as the immanent source of legitimate authority and the 
collective subject of rule. Kelsen’s quest for the demos claims to be heavily inspired by 
                                                          
11 Max Weber, «Science as a Vocation», in Gerth and Wright Mills (Eds.), From Max Weber, pp. 129-156. 
12 See Weber, Economy and Society, p. 989: «Such an apparatus [bureaucracy] makes “revolution,” in the 
sense of the forceful creation of entirely new formations of authority, more and more impossible (…). The 
place of “revolutions” is under this process taken by coups d’état (…).»  
13 See Max Weber, «Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen H rrschaft», in Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze 
zur Wissenschaftslehre, Seventh Edition, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1973, p. 487. 
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Rousseau in its reading of the ideas of freedom andequality.14 However, the 
Rousseaunian connection soon begins to fade away, as Kelsen’s deepest epistemological 
concerns move to the fore. The point is not only that the author rejects the utopian 
prospects of an actual elimination of the rule of man over man. Much like Weber, Kelsen, 
too, considers democracy a form of domination (Herrschaft). But more significantly 
perhaps, in stark contrast to the Rousseaunian tradition15, the author refuses to conceive 
the people in substantive terms as an empirically existing entity. In his view, the people 
is and remains an abstract, normative construct, which can only fictitiously be 
personified. 
Yet, the Kelsenian break with a substantivistic – in the author’s terminology: 
hypostatized – approach to the concept of the people does not merely indicate a move 
away from the footsteps of Rousseau. Much more importantly, it marks the author’s 
attempt to liberate the theories of law and the state from the intellectual horizon of 
theology, so as to make them attain the level of a truly modern science. 
In 1922/23, Kelsen published an important, though often overlooked, article called 
«God and the State»16, which sets out to investigate the analogies both e ween the two 
concepts and between the disciplines – theology and law – which study them. In the first 
part of the essay, drawing on Feuerbach, Durkheim and Freud, Kelsen explores the 
parallels between the social and the religious problems. According to him, the 
unconditional subjection to a higher authority which haracterizes the religious 
experience is quite identical to the subordination o the imperative injunctions of state and 
society. The second part of the text, in turn, presents a more ambitions argument. 
Suggesting that the theory of the state exhibits striking similarities with theology, Kelsen 
argues that such nexus must be broken, if a pure science of law and the state should 
emerge. In the author’s view, the problem with the concepts of God and the state, as they 
are commonly understood by the disciplines of theology and law, is that they are 
personifications unduly turned into reifications (or hypostatizations) of abstract notions 
of overarching unity: 
 
«If the person called “the state”, created by juristic knowledge to illustrate the unity of the 
legal system, is hypostatized in the usual manner ad contrasted to the law – whose unity 
such personification of the state merely expresses – as a distinct being, one faces quite the 
same problem or pseudo-problem as in theology. The latter can only persist as a discipline 
which differs from moral or natural science insofar as one holds to the transcendence of 
God over the world – this fundamental dogma of all theology –, to the existence of a 
supernatural, extra-earthly God. Similarly, indeed, a octrine of the state which differs from 
the theory of law is only possible as long as one believes in the transcendence of the state 
over the law, in the existence or rather in the sham existence of a meta-legal, extra-legal 
state.»17 
 
                                                          
14 See Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, First Edition, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1920, 
pp. 3-12. 
15 More precisely, to Georg Jellinek, one of the leading jurists of the traditional Imperial Rechtslehre. 
16 Hans Kelsen, «Gott und Staat», in Hans Klecatsky, René Marcic, Herbert Schambeck (Eds.), Die Wiener 
rechtstheoretische Schule: Schriften von Hans Kelsen, Adolf Merkel, Alfred Verdross, Vol. 1, Vienna, 
Europa Verlag, 1968, pp. 171-193. 
17 Kelsen, «Gott und Staat», p. 181 (translation mine). 
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The analogies between both reifications – of God an the state – are numerous, but 
they can all be brought back to the duplication of the object of knowledge which, 
according to Kelsen, is the product of every hypostatization. Indeed, theology and law 
seek to square a circle with formally equivalent theories, composed of two distinct 
instances. Firstly, there is voluntary submission t the created order. In theology, this 
happens when God takes human shape, with the scission between God, the almighty 
father, and his human son, who is bound to the lawsof nature. Legal theory, for its part, 
postulates the principle of the voluntary commitment of the state to the legal order it has 
established, so as to explain the mysterious «metamorphosis of the state qua power into 
the state qua law»18. Secondly, there is exceptional transgression of the created order. The 
concept of miracle, which designates a momentary, divinely imposed suspension of the 
laws of nature, allows theology to reaffirm God’s omnipotence and transcendence. 
Likewise – and Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology, as one will see below, is the most 
explicit expression of this –, legal theory reasserts the sovereignty of the state by allowing 
it, in the presence of extraordinary circumstances, to step beyond – partially or totally 
annulling – the existing legal order. Rejecting these analogies, Kelsen appears overtly as 
an epistemological atheist who wishes to expunge the knowledge of law and the state 
from theological (pseudo-)dilemmas and their (pseudo-)solutions.19 A man of modern 
science, he discards both the notion of the natural mir cle, as a momentary suspension of 
the causal laws of nature imposed by the omnipotent God, and the idea of a «legal 
miracle»20 (Rechstwunder), which pretends to affirm the sovereignty of the state by 
making it transcend, in exceptional conditions, the legal order it created in the first place. 
The triumph of form and function over substance in Kelsen’s pure theory of law and 
the state has significant implications for his understanding of democracy. Since 
democracy designates a specific form of state, it necessarily shares the latter’s general 
formal features. Thus, a democratic state, too, is reduced to the democratic legal order, to 
the expression of its systematic unity, to an abstrct «point of imputation»21 
(Beziehungspunkt) o which the actions of its agents or organs are attributed. Ultimately, 
however, this formal understanding of the state as a complex compound of abstract 
normative relations, hierarchically organized as a system of delegation and 
representation, can only do little to affirm democracy from the point of view of the ideas 
of freedom, equality and popular rule. In fact, rather more modestly, in the mid-1920s 
Kelsen ends up defending parliamentary democracy essentially as the achievable 
compromise between some degree of popular participation in the creation of the legal 
order and the inescapable requirements of the social div sion of labor, which he views as 
a necessary condition for progress.22 Yet, an additional argument, which not only draws 
democracy closer to the orbit of Kelsen’s secularist and scientific Weltanschauung, but 
also narrows the gap between democracy’s ideology of freedom and equality and its 
institutional realities, is supplied to such a frail case for the democratic state: the idea of 
democracy as the fundamental political expression of a relativistic understanding of truth 
and knowledge. 
                                                          
18 Ibid., p. 185 (translation mine). 
19 See ibid., pp. 191-192. 
20 Ibid., p. 189. 
21 Ibid., p. 187. 
22 See, above all, Hans Kelsen, «Das Problem des Parlamentarismus», in Klecatsky, Marcic, Schambeck 
(Eds.), Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, pp. 1661-1687. 
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The idea of relativism, on the one hand, helps Kelsen conceive the people, as it really 
exists, in pluralistic terms. The political parties merge thus as the irreplaceable 
instruments of modern democracy, and the attainment of a consensual, supra-partisan 
general will – a part of the nineteenth-century parliamentary ideal – is discarded as a sheer 
meta-political illusion. On the other hand, and above all, relativism reconnects Kelsen’s 
democratic theory with his epistemology. Indeed, just as there is no absolute truth which 
transcends the limits of human cognition, there can also be no absolute value from which 
social and political authority might be unconditionally derived, irrespective of the 
conflicting wills of the actual members of the political community: 
 
«Because democracy weighs everyone’s political will equally, it must also respect each 
political belief and opinion (…) in equal measure. If one renounces to the knowledge of an 
absolute value, the opposite opinion must also be deemed possible. Relativism is therefore 
the conception of the world presupposed by the democratic idea.»23 
 
However, the lack of a substantive axiological foundation to democracy involves 
specific risks, which the triumph of form and method over substance in the modern theory 
of knowledge was actually spared from. To be sure, modern science was always subject 
to being challenged by rival or alternative sources of meaning, truth and knowledge, even 
if its social prestige seemed to increase with every t chnological advance or cultural 
achievement it contributed to. Yet, boundaries were clearly marked: religious adversaries 
of science generally refused to enter the latter’s realm, just as much as the apologists of 
scientific modernity declined to play the game of religious transcendence. The case is 
utterly different with the radical pluralism of relativistic democracy, which, as Kelsen 
acknowledges, so as not to became entangled in a «fateful contradiction»24, must not deny 
its most ruthless absolutist enemies access to its wn instruments, i. e., the change to 
freely participate in the definition of the legal/political order – hence leaving the door 
open to the abolition of democracy through democratic means. The «fatherless society»25 
of democracy, the fraternal order of immanent freedom, equality and pluralism, cannot 
prevent the menace of a revenge of the father26. 
 
4. Schmitt: a politico-theological challenge to modern politics 
 
Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy and secular modernity appears as one of 
the most radical attempts to reaffirm the idea of transcendent political authority in the late 
modern era. Schmitt’s rejection of the capitalist economy and its liberal political order 
has distinct layers, which extend from an early literary-aesthetic condemnation of modern 
civilization to the astute exposure of the contradictions of the parliamentary state. Yet, 
the core of Schmitt’s critique is located in his Political Theology, with its peremptory 
assertion – contra Kelsen – that the problem of the foundations of the political order must 
not leave the orbit of metaphysical-theological reasoning. 
                                                          
23 Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, p. 36 (translation mine). 
24 Hans Kelsen, «Verteidigung der Demokratie», Blätter der Staatspartei, 2. Jahrgang, p. 98 (translation 
mine). 
25 Hans Kelsen, «Foundations of Democracy», Ethics, 66 (1), 1955, p. 31. 
26 I borrow the expression from Peter Gay’s Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider, New York and 
London, W. W. Norton, 2001, p. 102. 
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Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty is marked by the primacy of the exception over the 
norm. According to the well-known inaugural sentence of Political Theology, 
«[s]overeign is he who decides on the state of exception»27. This means that only under 
extraordinary circumstances, in the context of a real emergency, can light be shed upon 
the true subject of sovereignty, who is thus irreducible to a system of abstract legality. 
Still, what does this concept of sovereignty as decision on the exception have to do with 
a theological understanding of the problem of political legitimacy? Well, in another 
decisive passage of the same work, the author posits tha  «[a]ll significant concepts of the 
modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts»28. 
Indeed, the legal and political idea of decision on the exception as the revelation of 
the true sovereign is, in Schmitt’s view, nothing but the secularization of the theological 
concept of miracle; the former plays in the theory f the state the exact same role as the 
latter in theology. Whilst, as we saw above, Kelsen ought to discard the notion of the 
«legal miracle», which constituted an obvious obstacle to the rise of a science of law and 
the state free from theological contamination, Schmitt speaks simultaneously against the 
modern repression of state sovereignty as decision on the exception – in favor of the 
primacy of the abstract norm – and against the retrat of an actively intervening God from 
the world: 
 
«For the idea of the modern constitutional state triumphs together with deism, a theology 
and a metaphysics that banishes the miracle from the world. This theology and 
metaphysics rejects both the direct divine intervention through an exceptional 
transgression of the laws of nature which is conveyed by the idea of the miracle and the 
direct intervention of the sovereign in a valid legal order. The rationalism of the 
Enlightenment dismissed the exception in every form.»29 
 
Given the inextricable link he posits between political thought and theology, Schmitt 
is inevitably drawn to the conclusion that modern secularization constitutes not only a 
general turn away from religion, but also the eclipse of political ideas. Indeed, Schmitt 
interprets modern secular civilization as a grand «struggle against the political»30. This 
modern retreat of religious and political ideas leaves the author at pains to translate his 
thought into a clearly delineated alternative to liberalism. The panorama must have been 
quite frightening in his eyes: Protestant sects, as Weber had shown, were the spiritual 
sources of capitalism and liberalism; Lutheran deference to authority crumbled, if not 
earlier, with the fall of the Wilhelmine Empire after World War One; and political 
Catholicism (in whose circles Schmitt first became politically active) seemed to be 
increasingly compromising, in Germany and elsewhere, with the secular forces of 
parliamentarism and democracy. Of course, visions of a r bust authoritarianism aiming 
                                                          
27 Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, Ninth Edition, Berlin, 
Duncker & Humblot, 2009, p. 13 (translation mine). 
28 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, p. 43 (translation mine). 
29 Ibid. (translation mine). 
30 Ibid., pp. 68-68 (translation mine): «Today nothing is more modern than the struggle against the political. 
American financiers, industrial technicians, Marxist socialists, and anarcho-syndicalist revolutionaries 
unite around the demand that the unobjective rule of politics over the objectivity of economic life be 
eliminated. There should only be organizational-techni al and economic-sociological tasks, but no more 
political problems. The prevailing type of thinking is no longer capable of perceiving a political idea. The 
modern state seems to have indeed become what Max Weber sees in it: a huge apparatus.» 
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to overcome the crisis of the liberal state, even if of mainly secular inspiration, flourished 
in the early twentieth century. And, to be sure, Schmitt endorsed their ideas and adopted 
their languages in several instances. Still, he was never, in essence, a radical nationalist, 
in spite of the circumstantial attraction to the political mythology of fascism.31 Nor was 
he a conservative thinker strictly in search of a political stability which pluralistic 
democracy appeared unable to secure, even if a cursory reading of his exploitation of the 
plebiscitary tendencies of the Weimar Constitution might suggest that.32 Schmitt’s praise 
of fascism has less to do with any genuine nationalst enthusiasm – for him, in the last 
analysis, a mere derivative of pagan, polytheistic idolatry33 – than with the longed-for 
restoration of the supreme authority of the state34. And his notion of plebiscitary 
leadership does not really testify to a concern with political stability in a strict sense, but 
rather to a deep hunger for unchallengeable order – a hunger stemming from profound 
religious sources. 
Of course, the fact that the state, as the modern embodiment of political order, has an 
undeniable transcendent deficit and emerges, in itself, as a product of secularization, is 
something Schmitt knew all along.35 But such fragment of achievable order was still 
worth fighting for, still worth vindicating against both the deceitful universalist promises 
and the actual pluralist degeneration of secular liberalism.36 To the cause of statist 
authoritarianism Schmitt could find plenty of associates, but none actually shared his 
deepest theological concerns. The collaboration with the racist ideology of the Nazis 
expresses perhaps the ultimately unavoidable tragedy of this last great 
counterrevolutionary thinker. 
   
5. Conclusion 
 
This late modern dispute on political legitimacy and its «ultimate grounds» provides 
no fully satisfying answers to the issues and dilemmas it raises. Nor could it, to be fair. 
The rise of modernity’s immanent frame constituted, and still constitutes, a challenge to 
political thought in general, and to the problem of legitimate order in particular. Max 
Weber was one of the first thinkers to face it, in an attempt to reconcile divergent claims. 
On the one hand, the acknowledgement of the necessities immanent to modernity, of the 
processes, instruments and institutions which set it  general tone. On the other, the 
persisting reliance on charisma, on the personal chrismatic devotion to grand causes, 
whose transformative potential, even if short of the «prophetic pneuma, which in former 
                                                          
31 For the author’s flirtation with Italian fascism, see Carl Schmitt, «Die politische Theorie des Mythus», 
in Carl Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923-1939, Third 
Edition, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1994, pp. 11-21; Carl Schmitt, «Wesen und Werden des 
faschistischen Staates», in Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe, pp. 124-130.  
32 See Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1931; Carl Schmitt, Legalität und 
Legitimität, Munich and Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1932.  
33 See Schmitt, «Die politische Theorie des Mythus», p. 20 (translation mine): «For political theology, this 
[the political mythologies of nationalism and fascism] is polytheism, just as every myth is polytheistic.» 
34 Schmitt, «Wesen und Werden des faschistischen Staates», p. 128 (translation mine): «The fascist state 
decides not as a neutral, but as a higher third party. That constitutes its supremacy.» 
35 See, above all, Schmitt’s book on Hobbes, written shortly after the author had fallen from grace with the 
Nazis: Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines 
politischen Symbols, Second Edition (Günther Maschke), Cologne, Hohenheim, 1982.  
36 See Carl Schmitt, «Staatsethik und pluralistischer Staat», in Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe, p. 162: 
«(…) a piece of concrete order is more valuable than e empty generalities of a false totality.» 
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times swept through the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together»37, 
might still help prevent the full closure of the modern «iron cage» and the ensuing 
enslavement of mankind by the forces of rationalism and materialism.  
Hans Kelsen, for his part, rules out the need for any break whatsoever with 
modernity’s immanent forces. According to him, the legal/political order must be justified 
in its own rational terms, without recourse to the sophisms of theology. Kelsen ends ups 
finding a sort of anti-foundational foundation to modern democracy in the worldview of 
relativism, characterized by a scientific equidistance from all the passions, interests, 
values, beliefs and opinions at stake in the democratic competition for political power. 
But the democratic relativist would soon have to recognize the flimsiness of such base, 
and how it could not possibly prevent the self-destruction of democracy, its appropriation 
by the advocates of autocracy and political absolutism. 
Carl Schmitt exploited the paradoxes and fragilities of pluralist/liberal democracy 
with unmatched sharpness. However, his grander ambition was that of an 
uncompromising, theologically-inspired rupture with modern secular politics, or, to be 
more precise, with the modern evaporation of «the political». There was more than a hint 
of anachronism in such a venture. Indeed, if monotheis ic Christian faith had been its 
original source of inspiration, it ended up joining the swarming secular political 
mythologies that promised to transcend the crumbling liberal-capitalist order in the first 
decades of the past century. 
 
Historically, of course, Max Weber’s, Hans Kelsen’s and Carl Schmitt’s reflections 
on the foundations of political order are set in the prelude to perhaps the greatest 
catastrophe of European civilization: the Third Reich. And they have all suffered, rightly 
or wrongly, from being read in such a retrospective light. Post-1945 political thought in 
the West was marked by the renaissance of natural right theory, both as a reaction to the 
horrors of the recent past and as an alternative to the materialist doctrines glorified in the 
Soviet East. As late-modern thinkers, Weber, Kelsen and Schmitt, in spite of everything 
that sets them apart, shared a deep dissatisfaction with the basic premises of natural law. 
The postwar marginalization of their political ideas, or their turning into a favorite object 
of critique by some of the promoters of the resurgence of natural law, was surely not 
unexpected. This predominance of natural right theory has caused a reorientation of 
political thought to the domains of ethics and morality, which has brought about the 
primacy of issues of distributive justice. Still, the questions raised by the late modern 
German contentions on the problem of political legitimacy reverberate today, even if they 
tend to remain hidden beneath a more or less reassuring veil. As Kelsen said, those 
concerned with finding out what lies beyond positive law, and serves as its foundation, 
will encounter «neither the absolute truth of metaphysics nor the absolute justice of 
natural right. Whoever lifts the veil and does not close his eyes, will see the hideous 
Gorgon face of Power staring back at him.»38 
It takes courage to look power in the eye, and the terrain is as difficult now as it was 
a century ago. Remaining within the immanent frame of modern politics provides only 
short, unsatisfying answers; embracing temptations of transcendence might, in turn, prove 
                                                          
37 Weber, «Science as a Vocation», p. 155. 
38 Hans Kelsen, «Diskussionsrede zu den Berichten „Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz im Sinne des art. 109 
der Reichsverfassung“», Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, 3, 1927, p. 
55 (translation mine). 
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to be fatally dangerous. To question the «ultimate grounds» of political order and 
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